Abstract. We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.
Rationale
In disputation, claims are supported by arguments, w h i c h refer to rules, cases, and evidence. S o m e t i m e s , the rationales of rules and the rationales of decisions in cases appear in disputation as well.
Rationales appear in procedural contexts such as debate, dialectical inquiry, a n d legal argument. In purely declarative contexts, w h e r e i n logic usually is defined, the effect of rationales on inference is u n k n o w n ; there appears to be no i m p o r t a n t role in logic for rationales of rules, once the rules h a v e b e e n adopted.
A rationale for a rule is a structure that contains relevant i n f o r m a t i o n about the reason for the rule's adoption. A rationale for a case, similarly, is relevant additional inform a t i o n a b o u t the decision reached. F o l l o w i n g T o u l m i n [1958] , o n e can refer to the rationale as the " b a c k i n g " of the " w a r r a n t . " In the l a n g u a g e of legal philosophy, ratio decidendi 1 and ratio legis are rationales. Rationales are related to "principle" or "purpose." Our essential question is what are the appropriate forms of rationales and how they can be brought to bear in argument.
There are many kinds of rationales; rules are adopted on various grounds. Defeasible rules can be adopted through inductive reasoning, on the whim of authority, or by arbitrait convention. A defeasible rule that is a policy, which might be a rule in a legal domain, often balances competing interests. Sometimes the particular balance struck is part of the grounds for the rule's adoption. Sometimes the rule strikes a balance in a principled way, but as often it has the right politics or expedience. Sometimes the grounds for adopting a policy are decision-theoretic. Decisions in precedent-setting cases can be made on similar grounds.
The rationales for rules and cases considered here are not intended to exhaust those that can be imagined. They might generally be called compilation rationales. Compilation rationales are those that compile pieces of past disputations, past lines of argument, past preferences of one argument over another, past projections from cases. They have the advantage of being modeled fully within the vocabulary of a system of argument. Excluded, for instance, are decision-theoretic rationales, which require the introduction of additional information representing utilities. The present aim is to discuss how dialectical moves force reversion to the forms from which rules were compiled, and how existing models of argument might usefully be augmented, how the repertoire of formally modeled moves might be increased.
The compilation rationales to be discussed are as follows. For rules: adopt a rule because it compresses a line of reasoning (compression, or c-rationale); adopt a rule because it specializes a general principle (specialization, or s-rationale); adopt a rule because it expresses a regularity that fits a set of cases (fit, or f-rationale). For cases: form an opinion despite conflicting factors by resolving the conflict (resolution, or r-rationale); form an opinion because the set of arguments in the recorded disputation of the case, which may be incomplete, warrants the opinion (disputation, or d-rationale).
To attack a well-formed argument, with rationales unmentioned, there are usually a couple of alternatives:
i. Attack some subpart of the argument or provide a separate argument for a contrary conclusion. ii. Attack the legitimacy of the move at the point at which it occurs. Attack the sufficiency of the argument at the present point in the dialogue. That is, show that the move does not meet the player's burdens, or provide reasons for claiming that the argument does not defeat the argument that it is said to defeat, or otherwise impugn its place or station. There is yet another class of moves, moves that make use of rationales: iii. Attack a rule used in the argument by citing its rationale and claiming that the rule's scope is exceeded in this application.
iv. Attack a rule that derives from a case, a case-based argument, by citing the rationale for the decision in the case and arguing that the decision is flawed. A new argument that should have been considered has been discovered. v. Argue that the decision provides no guidance in the current situation. An argument that can now be made, in the current situation, would have effectively countered the argument that led to the decision in the case. vi Argue that a rule is a particular form of a more general rule, or a modern restatement of an older rule, a derivation from broader principle, or a version of a separate rule; then restate the rule in its original form; then attack the new rule, the strength of which has now been altered under considerations of lex specialis, lex posterior, or lex superior The purpose of this paper is to sketch a formal account of what data would be required to make such moves, and how those moves affect the state of disputation.
Informal Examples of Compilation Rationales
First, consider each of the rationales in simple examples.
Compression, or c-rationale
As a defeasible rule, "vehicles used for private transportation are not allowed in the park." Meanwhile, defeasibly, "vehicles are normally for private transportation." There is therefore a two-step argument for disallowing vehicles in the park. Adopt the policy with the rationale of compression that as a rule, "no vehicles in the park."
To attack an argument using a rule with a c-rationale, restate the argument in an uncompressed form. The resulting uncompressed argument will be more susceptible to attack. Uncompressed arguments present more points to counterattack. They are also not as direct, so they are more easily defeated in some syntactic accounts of defeat among arguments.
Attack by arguing that emergency vehicles are not used for private transportation. This does not affect the argument using the compressed rule, but it devastates the uncompressed argument.
Compression would be fragile except that rules are typically compressed only when the argument being compressed is resistant to counterargument. It would be folly to compress long arguments, for instance, into rules. Arguments constructed thereupon would always be challenged because attacking the uncompressed form will be possible.
Specialization, or s-rationale
As a principle, "tranquil public spaces should be preserved." "Parks are tranquil public spaces." "Disallowing vehicles in a tranquil space is a way to preserve tranquility." There is currently an argument that a particular park, defeasibly, is a public space, and defeasibly, that it should be undisturbed. There is currently no argument that such a park should have vehicles disallowed in it. There may be other ways to preserve. The problem is that so far, the converse of the third rule (if we may talk about the converse of a defeasible rule) is missing: "In order to preserve a tranquil space, disallow vehicles." But a policy-maker might adopt as a rule, "no vehicles in the park," in order to further the principle in some particular way. When there is a principle served in this way, we call the rule a rule of implementation. For any principle, there are many possible competing rules of implementation.
Usually, a rule of implementation is adopted in the presence of counterarguments. For instance, "barring vehicles increases commuting effort." There are tradeoffs associated with any particular way of implementing a principle. In such instances, the rationale for the rule is more advanced. It is a balance of competing interests, which might actually be an f-rationale, d-rationale, or r-rationale. The s-rationale here is more naive; it is intended to be very simple. One way to preserve is to disallow vehicles; disallowing vehicles
• ~K,._ lmiJlements a kind of preservation. We simply assume that the missing rule is implicit: "defeasibly, preservation entails disallowing vehicles."
Attack, a specialized rule by restating the argument so that the rule in question has its antecedent expressed more generally: "insofar as public spaces should be preserved, no vehicles allowed in public spaces." A counterargument based on a rule, "vehicles are allowed on public roads in public spaces," will now suffice as a reply (assuming that the vehicle in question can be argued to have been on a public road). Prior to citing the rationale, such a counterargument might be ineffective because it is less specific: it refers to public spaces, not to parks. Formally, attacks on s-rationales will be equivalent to attacks on c-rationales, except that there will be a general rule or principle in the argument.
Attack, too, by identifying a different way of meeting the demands of the guiding rule, by suggesting a different implementation. This attack is possible if a rule was adopted without full consideration of counterarguments. It will be formally equivalent to attacks using r-or d-rationales.
Since principles can be implemented in numerous ways, rules based on s-rationales are fragile. They eventually will be challenged and replaced with rules or cases with f-, d-, or r-rationales.
Fit, or f-rationale
Adopt a rule because it expresses a regularity among cases. Cases can be actual or hypothetical, but there should be widespread agreement over the way they are decided.
Rule-adoption based on f-rationale is related to theory-formation in scientific reasoning. As in scientific theory-formation, coherence and simplicity are important. Unlike scientific theory-formation, errors of legal fit are not tolerable. Though errors are not tolerated, there is a way to eliminate errors of legal fit that is not available to scientific theorizing. Errors of legal fit can be eliminated without altering the legal rule. A more specific legal rule that deals with exceptions can simply be added to the body of rules. This option is not possible for scientific theory.
The policy "no vehicles in the park" might allegedly fit the cases: (case1) disallowed: a private automobile driving through the park; t 63 (case2) disallowed: an antique automobile parked in the park; (case3) disallowed: a golf cart driven into the park; (case4) allowed: a pedestrian strolling in the park. An argument using a rule with f-rationale can be attacked by first proposing a new rule that equally successfully distinguishes the recorded cases of allowed parking from cases of disallowed parking. Then the attack continues by (a) noting that the new rule no longer applies to the current fact situation (or at least, that no argument that it applies has been given), or by (b) noting that the reformulated rule applies but is not as specific as originally suggested. In the latter situation, the argument is susceptible to attack by counterarguments that would have been considered less specific on the earlier formulation of the rule. Once again, the defeat relations among arguments can be altered by citing rationale.
Reformulating rules corresponds to arguing over which theory has the best fit. We are unwilling at the moment to postulate the conditions under which one "policy theory" fits better than a competing policy theory. Philosophy of science, similarly, still cannot articulate conditions precisely for one scientific theory fitting better than another. Thus, competing policies fitting cases merely interfere with each other; neither can defeat the other until coherence and simplicity and other criteria of fit have been addressed.
An argument using a rule with an f-rationale may also be attacked by adding or deleting cases. For example, to attack the rationale of this rule, add a case, such as (case5) allowed: a vehicle delivering a tree to be planted in the park; or delete a case e.g., claim that (case3) is incorrectly decided. Or propose a different regularity consistent with the cases: "vehicles, excluding those performing essential park or public functions, are not allowed in the park".
Since it is easy to theorize about cases with sets of defeasible rules (and allege a regularity), rules with f-rationale will be robust only if the question of fit is addressed in detail.
Resolution, or r-rationale
Suppose a case of the hurried government official who detours his automobile through the park. It raises two arguments that interfere with each other without either defeating the other. "No vehicles in the park." "Public officials on official business have use of public spaces." The decision to disallow such detours sets a precedent upon which a variety of future arguments can be constructed. The rationale of the decision, of the precedent, is that it resolves the conflicting factors: preservation of public space, versus availability of public resources for government business.
To attack an argument relying on this precedent, cite the rationale. Then claim that a new case introduces additional interests which, when weighed, could alter the balance of the prior decision. For instance, suppose a subsequent case also introduces the element of time. In the new case, the official drove through the park when the park was closed. In the precedent-setting case, the time of day was Saturday noon. Now arguments based on time of day, government business, and preservation of public spaces must be weighed.
Without citing the rationale and attacking the grounds for the precedent, an argument for allowing the new detour based on time of day could still be made. The difference is subtle. Discount the old precedent and the new resolution must start anew, weighing time of day and government business against the ban on vehicles in the park. Leave the rationale of prior decision unmentioned, and the current case will compare time of day against an established precedent based both on government business and the ban on vehicles in the park.
Because new cases typically introduce significant new factors unweighed in the earlier decision, precedents with r-rationales tend to be fragile. But as noted, the stakes are not high when an r-rationale precedent is discounted by this kind of attack.
R-rationales are special kinds of d-rationales. So there are other attacks on r-rationales that are described as attacks on d-rationales.
Disputation, or d-rationale
Disputation informs the decision in a case. This decision can be simpler than the weighing of conflicting factors. A decision might simply have been mandated by superior argument, where the adjudicator played no major role. Appeal to such a case in future argument is susceptible to review of the recorded disputation of the case. The arguments that were persuasive in the prior case may not be persuasive in the present case and its new context.
When the record of the disputation that led to decision can be recalled, the decision has a d-rationale. The use of such a precedent depends on whether the result of disputation can be significantly corrupted when the same arguments are applied again. Sometimes there are new arguments that can be made that would change the decision or the simplicity of the decision. A different attack on a rule with d-rationale occurs when past disputation was incomplete. Not all arguments that could have been advanced were advanced in the prior disputation.
Suppose a case of an ambulance parked in the park while its crew was off-duty. The parking was decided to be disallowed. One side argued that the ambulance was permitted to park because it was an emergency vehicle. The adjudicator held, on the other hand, that despite being an emergency vehicle, parking was disallowed for emergency vehicles that were not prepared to respond to an emergency. Suppose the arguments were of such forms that the case was decided on syntactic grounds. Consider a subsequent case of an off-duty ambulance that remained prepared to respond. The persuasiveness of the precedent depends on whether the decision's rationale, a d-rationale, is exposed. According to precedent, "off-duty ambulances are not allowed in the park." The opposition successfully defeats this argument by recalling that an ability to respond to emergency was crucial to the past decision. Imagine that the ambulance's ability to respond can be established in the new case. The argument from precedent is no longer persuasive.
Formal Requirements
In many models of argument, arguments are produced by chaining rules from a set of defeasible rules, L, and are grounded in a set of undisputed premises, or evidence, E.
Case-based reasoning supplements the set of rules by permitting rules to be formulated from cases. There is thus a set, C of cases, the effect of which is to augment L. Rules(L, C) = L • RulesFrom(C), given some appropriate way of extracting rules from cases, RulesFrom. This is one framework in which to formalize legal and policy reasoning, a framework inherited from the logicians, suitably altered by researchers in philosophical logic and artificial intelligence. There have been some explanations of the way that cases augment rules in formal systems, as described in the Rissland-Ashley work [1987] .
Formally, we may start with a logical language: sentences, S, and a notion of consistency. E is a consistent set of sentences in the logic. L is a set of pairs of sentences, where a pair <p, q> in L means that p is reason for q, and is written p >--q. C is a set of case descriptions, where each description is a list of properties (or their negations) of the case, and there is a hierarchy among the properties, distinguishing at least between evidence and judgement, and possibly several levels in between.
One may choose to view the logic as a notation for describing, i.e., for declaring commitments, or as a language in which to conduct discourse according to some procedure, i.e., to compute or discover cormmtments.
Declaratively (i.e., from a traditional logical point of view), the emphasis is on the complete set of arguments that can be constructed upon L, C, and E: Args(L, C, E). A conclusion must be warranted with respect to the full complement of arguments: if an effective counterargument is possible, then an argument fails to warrant its conclusion, whether anyone ever finds that counterargument. Alchourron & Bulygin [1971] , Soeteman [1989] , Simari & Loui [1992] and Prakken [1993] are examples of declarative accounts of argumentative and legal reasoning.
Procedurally (i.e., computationally), parties to a dialogue consume limited resources, producing a succession of sets Argsi(L, C, E), corresponding to the various stages i=l, 2, .... n of the dispute. Warrant is defined with respect to a particular set of arguments at a particular stage, Argsi(L, C, E). The appropriate stage is determined by a termination role. Sometimes termination is known in advance; sometimes it is a bound that is revealed when it is reached; sometimes an i is appropriate merely because Args i has a quiescence, e.g., because one party can make no useful response. The protocol for inquiry may allow parties to introduce objects significant to the dispute, other than arguments. For example, challenges might be allowed in the dialogue. See Rescher [1997] , Alexy [1989] , Skalak & Rissland [1991] , Loui [1992] , Sartor [1993b] , Vreeswijk [1993] , and Gordon [1993] . (Figures 2, and 3) .
The behaviors of the various rationales are sufficiently varied that some complexity is required in order properly to model them.
The c-and s-rationales for rules, and the d-rationale, for cases, are appropriately modeled by substituting less compact arguments (or substituting suites of arguments) for the original argument. Disputation can then continue after the unpacking.
The f-rationale and r-rationale require an entirely different mechanism. When arguments using rules or cases with these rationales are attacked, the dispute is about the outcomes of other disputes. A mechanism for meta-argument is required, and the simplest adequate devices are used here.
We present first the formalism for rationales that can be treated wholly at the object level, then augment the formalism to handle the meta-level disputes. For a formal system to treat all five kinds of compilation rationales, it would have to integrate the mechanisms for unpacking and for meta-argument. In the interest of clarity, this is not done here.
OB JECT-LEVEL DIS PUTATION
Formally, the record of a disputation includes a sequence of moves,
Defn. Disputations as Moves.
A disputation is a sequence, M n = <m0, ml ..... mn>.
Each move may consist of several things: a claim, perhaps paired with an argument for the claim, perhaps an argument for the sufficiency of the pair at this point in the disputation.
A simple protocol for dispute is a two-player immediate-response dialectic (several alternate protocols are described in Loui [1992] :
i. there are two advocates, who are players, and an adjudicator who has no moves; ii. moves alternate between players; iii. each move must alter current opinion, which is determinable syntactically, and which is either pro, con, or none; iv. all arguments must be well-formed: i.e., members of Args(L, C, E); v. arguments do not occur repeatedly in the record: i.e., once an argument is introduced, it need not and cannot be introduced again. The internal Structure of the argument, ai, in each move, mi, has been the topic of most recent research on argument (e.g., [Sartor 1993b , Prakken, 1993 , Simari & Loui 1992 , Loui et al. 1993a ). We have intentionally not required a particular form of arguments. However, the examples use the following structure for arguments. 
i~( a---)-" m ' --and so on ... Defn. Arguments. An argument is a structure, <{ 11, 12 ..... }, h>, where each lj is in Rules(L, C), and h is the main claim of the argument.
Other authors discuss mimimality and connectedness properties at length: that is, how the lj's and h relate to one another. The sufficiency of the move depends crucially on the defeat relations among arguments introduced in Mn. As an example, the following dispute proceeds according to a reasonable dialectical protocol: 1. pro: {el >--h}, h opinion: pro 2. con: {e 2 >--b, b>--not-h}, not-h opinion: none 3. pro: {el & e2 >--not-b}, not-b opinion: pro establishing h (see figure 4) .
Preliminaries for c-, s-, and d-rationales
In procedural models, citing a rationale is a prelude to an attack. It is a necessary part of what makes the subsequent argument relevant and sufficient. It alters the context so that the subsequent argument is a legitimate move by the player. A rationale, cited, permits mi+ 1 to respond to m i. Without citing the rationale, mi+ 1 might not be a legitimate successor of m i. In declarative models, there are at least two ways to regard rationales.
Citing rationales may alter L or C, restating the formulation of rules and cases to which a player is willing to agree. In this way, the appropriate basis for warrant is Args(L', C', E) instead of Args(L, C, E).
The second way is to suppose that the rationale, cited, changes the relations of defeat among the arguments, def, the binary relation on Args(L, C, E) that is defined by the underlying system of argument. Contemporary systems regard argument a i as defeating argument a2 on syntactic criteria, or according to an externally supplied ordering, extord(Args(L, C, E)). The latter might arise from orderings on its constituents: extord(L) extord (C), extord(E). With rationales, the set of cited rationales, R, becomes a new index in the determination of defeat. The derivation of the defeat relation:
If R is static, then R is only important to those who study these mappings. This is why rationales do not have much importance in declarative settings. Taking R to be dynamic, as a sequence Ri, one may as well return to a procedural model. We will just assume a procedural model of argument.
Defn. Citable Rationales, R(1), R(c).
Let R(1) and R(c) respectively be all citable rationales for a defeasible rule, l in L, and a precedent-setting case, c in C.
The form of a rationale depends on the kind of rationale, as elaborated below. Practically, the most difficult part of arguing with rationales could be discovering and formulating the set R(1), for a rule 1, or R(c), for a case, c. Even when an authoritative decision is explained, and even when legislative deliberation is well preserved, formal expression of rationales as R is problematic. The assumption here is the usual assumption among formalists: just as evidence, E, wording of rules, L, and documentation of cases, C, can be expressed in formal language, so too can rationales, R. To address the problem more fully would be more ambitious than what is usually attempted by formalists.
The intention is that R(1) will be a singleton set for most rules (likewise for R(c)). There could be multiple citable rationales, and the difference could matter to the course of a particular dispute. There could also be no citable rationale.
If R(c) or R(1) is not a singleton for the relevant case or rule, then the parties can dispute the appropriate rationale. Since we suppose no information that would allow adjudication of such a dispute, the simplest reasonable procedure will be adopted.
If a rationale is raised for a rule or case in an argument, and there is a multiplicity of possible rationales, then it suffices that the player who makes use of the original argument can make progress under one of the many rationales. For example, suppose pro has the burden to establish h. Pro produces an argument A for h, using rule 1. If 1 has multiple rationales in R(1), let them be named rati(1), rat2(1 ), etc.; if they are of different types, name them c-ratl(1), d-rat2(1), etc. In the suggested protocol it suffices for pro if h can be established after utilizing pro's choice of the permitted rationales. Call this the User's Prerogative Assumption.
The procedural rules that implement this assumption merely complicate the presentation in an uninteresting way. The simplest way of making the assumption of user's pre-rogative is to assume that all R(c) and R(I) are either singletons or empty sets, for every rule 1 or case c0
Assumption. Rationales Unique as User's Prerogative. For each 1, if R(1) is nonempty, then it is a singleton. Likewise for each c and R(c).
Structures for c-, s-, and d-rationales
For rules of the form "p is defeasible reason for q", rationales take the following forms.
A c-rationale is an argument, with premises p and conclusion q. There may be a background, B, against which this argument was made. The intention in adopting the rule is that usually B will be present in contexts in which the rule is applied. A c-rationale may thus be an argument from p and B to q. Such an argument is as above, a 2-tuple:
where T is a subset of L; e-rat(p>--q) is in Args(T, { }, {p} w B) (see figure 5 ).
An s-rationale is formally identical to a c-rationale except that the argument takes a particular form. In a c-rationale, several rules are used in the argument, which is compressed. T is not a singleton set. An s-rationale uses a single guiding rule, a principle. It uses supplementary rules in L that permit the implementation of the principle, and probably relies on some sentences in B.
Defn. Specializations of Rules, s-rat, s-rat(p>--q) = <{princ, impl}, q>, where princ and impl are in L or in B; c-rat(p >--q) is in Args(T, ( }, {p} u B) (see Figure 6) .
A d-rationale of a case c is a set of arguments, d-rat(c), that has a certain structure. These arguments are typically not from Args(L, C, E) but are from a different set, Args(L', C', E'). The applicability of the case to the current situation depends crucially on whether the arguments in d-rat(c) are in both of these sets, not just in Args(L', C', E'). For a drationale, d-rat(c) is a set of arguments that warrants the decision of the case.
Defn. Disputations from Past Cases
where each argi is in the intersection of Args(L, C, E) and Args(L', C', E'), where <L', C', E'> describes the context of the prior case (see Figure 7) .
Attacks for c-, s-, and d-rationales
Let ArgRec n be the recognized arguments at a stage n in the sequence of moves.
In a simple disputation where moves do not refer to rationales and all arguments are well-formed members of Args(L, C, E), ArgRecn is simply the union of all arguments introduced in all moves, ml ..... mn. In disputations where well-formedness of an argument can be called into question (which includes disputations that allow rationale-based attacks on arguments), ArgRecn expands and contracts as the disputation proceeds. ArgRecn includes both defeated and undefeated arguments. It is not the "arguments in force" concept that Vreeswijk defines [1993] , which is useful in analyzing warranted conclusions. It is preliminary to determining which arguments are in force. An argument that was introduced in the dialogue but has subsequently been excluded from ArgRec cannot even be considered for its properties of defeat relative to the other arguments.
Here, r is an intermediate conclusion in argl, attacked by arg2. arg~ is reinstead by arg3's attack on arg 2 at s. The rule includes only the assumptions from argl. It could have included the assumptions in arg2 and arg 3 as well. i. an argument in mo is in ArgReco; ii. if mi does not contain a statement of rationale, then for an argument a i in mi, ArgReci contains ArgRec(i_l) u (ai}; iii. if mi contains a statement of a rationale, then this is either a rationale-based attack on prior argument, or else a reinstatement of an argument that has suffered a rationalebased attack. The effect on ArgRec i is as follows. A statement of a rationale in a move requires the naming of the argument that is attacked or defended. It also requires the naming of the rule or case, the rationale of which is at issue.
Defn. Rationale Moves, @. Let @i indicate that i is a move that uses a rationale.
For a move i such that @i, let ai be the argument concerned, and let 1 i or c i be the rule or case, as appropriate, in question. Let r i be the rationale, whether it is a c-, s-, or d-rationale. Let playeri be the player who moved in move i.
Trivial well-formedness requires that the attacked argument has occurred, that the rule occurs in the argument, and that the rationale is recognized:
Additional Constraints on Rationale Moves_ If @i, then iii.a, a i must be in ArgReck for some k < i (k need not be i-1 since defense against rationale-based attacks must be possible);
iii.b. 1 i or c i must be a part of ai; iii.c, r i must be in R(li), or R(ci). Note that ri and a i may have occurred together in a previous move, j < i, where both @i and @j. This seems to permit repetition of moves, but m i still might not be the same as mj. Repetition will be prevented by a requirement that moves be effective.
The same rule or case can repeatedly be the target of rationale-based attacks if it occurs in distinct arguments. This is simpler than calling all arguments based on a rule or case into question at once. Note that both players might be relying on the same argument, a i.
Apparently, the immediate effect of the attack is to remove a i from ArgRec i. That is, apparently, Argrec i = ArgRec(i.l) -{a~}. But the move might modify the form of the argument: removing a i and substituting a revised argument in its stead. So apparently,
Defn. Changes to The Argument Record, ArgRec: Part II: Effects of Rationale
Moves.
iv. ArgRec i = ArgRec0_l)-{ai} u argrevs, where argrevs contains a modified form of a i, or else is the empty set; For a c-rationale or s-rationale, which is an argument <T, h>, argrevs contains a revision of ai that uses <T, h> as a subargument in place of the rule, lj, that is attacked. So if <To, h0> =ai, then argrevs contains the argument in which a subargument has been substituted for the compressed rule: <T o u T -{li} , h0>. This substitution could be denoted: subst(ai, li, T). If indeed it is an argument (satisfies minimality and consistency conditions), it is the sole element of argrevs. Otherwise, the statement of the rationale destroys ai and there is no revised argument added in its place; argrevs is the empty set.
For a d-rationale, argrevs is r i, a set of arguments, mi must contain a new argument, attacki, which attacks argrevs and changes the current opinion, deci. In a d-rationale, the decision of the case is warranted among the arguments recorded for the case, ri. That is, enough arguments were recorded to support the decision outright. So m i must be such that r i u {attacki}, taken as the only arguments, would not have warranted the old decision outright.
Defn. The Revised Argument(s), argrevs, for c-, s-, and d-rationales.
iv.a. If @i cities a c-rationale or s-rationale, the argrevs = { subst(ai, li,T) } if subst(a i, 1 i, T) is a well-formed argument, otherwise, argrevs = { }; iv.b. If @i cites a d-rationale, then argrevs = d-rat(c 0 u {attacki}, where ci is the case attacked, and attack i is an argument that alters the status of ai's conclusion. This completes the inductive definition of ArgRec i. Finally, having defined ArgRec i in terms of mi and ArgRec(i_l) , we require the move m i to be effective: it must alter current opinion so that playeri's position is improved.
Responses to these simple kinds of rationale-based attacks are simple; they are moves that augment ArgRec.
For example, for a d-rationale, all of the arguments recorded of the past case have been entered into ArgRec. Among them was an argument, argw, that warranted the decision of the case. Also included is the opponent's attack, which has somehow changed the status of arg w. To respond substantively, simply give an argument that restores argw'S ability to support its conclusion again. Or simply retreat from the attacked precedent-based argument and provide a new, unrelated argument to support the old decision.
3.3.4.
EXAMPLE. A dialogue without a rationale. 
R. R LOUI AND JEFF NORMAN

Simple Symbolic Examples for c-, s-, and d-rationales
i.e., b is reason for a; i.e., b is asserted; therefore a.
i.e., c is reason for d; i.e., d and b are joint reason for not-a; i.e., c and b; therefore not-a.
i.e., c and e are joint reason for not-d; i.e., c and e; therefore not-d.
"a because of b." (comments now simplified)
"your argument is really:" "c because of b, a because of c" "because that is the rationale of the rule in your argument, and now here is my counterargument:"
"not-c because of b and d."
Con states a rationale for a rule, which presumably is the legitimate member of R( b >--a). Con must state the argument being attacked. The effect is to replace the compressed argument with the uncompressed, but this is still not a sufficient response for con. So con Here, arguments are 2-tuples (a set of rules paired with a conclusion). We have embellished each argument: instead of just giving the conclusion of the argument, we give the evidence on which the argument rests (marked with an exclamation point) and write ".'." to separate the conclusion. Rules are given in their sentential form, a >--b instead of using the pair <a, b>, and quotes are suppressed. Note that we use "=" to give a name to a structure. This is not to be confused with an assertion. At move 4, it is con's turn to move and opinion favors pro: arg 3 defeats arg2, thus reinstating arg 1. If con cannot move at this point, pro wins. Pro provides a new argument for a, arg3, that is undefeated in ArgRec 3. The new argument for c is specific enough to defeat arg2, which would reinstate argo, but arg~ has been flushed from the ArgRec in favor of arglrev.
ArgRec 3 = ArgRec 2 ~ { arg 3 }; dec 3 = pro.
EXAMPLE. An s-rationale. Here, ]--is used instead of >--to indicate that this rule is extracted from a case. This move suffices for pro because arg 3 now defeats da2, thus reinstating dal. Current opinion is for pro, to decide a, because da 1 is now in the ArgRec. Pro is lucky; the same new condition, g, that allows a distinction from the precedent also allows a new argument that replaces what was lost.
META-LEVEL DISPUTATION
For both the r-rationale and the f-rationale, disputation about disputation is required. This requires meta-claims, i.e., claims about claims, and meta-arguments about meta-claims. There are serious semantic difficulties for the formalist who takes defeasible reasoning to the meta-level. Technically, the semantic ascent to the meta-language is usually preferable to the demotion of the reason relation ">--" from a 2-place relation in the metalanguage to a 2-connective in the language. As Quine asks, "How do you hope to establish semantic connections between object level and meta-level? " [1990] A declarative approach to meta-disputation would indeed require serious study. A procedural approach would be one way to side-step the difficulty. Earlier writers who have reached this point, notably Toulmin and Rescher, have avoided this technical problem. Pollock, meanwhile, can be viewed as a first step in the procedural approach.
Here, we assume that a system of argument and meta-argument exists. Such a system determines some things: whether meta-arguments are undefeated and supporting, hence, whether their warranted meta-claims warranted; whether the arguments that make use of the warranted meta-claims are undefeated and supporting, hence, whether their objectlevel claims are warranted. This assumption is made for two reasons: (a) to define the envisioned procedural system would be a separate study not crucial to the picture of rationales that is drawn here; and (b) the use of meta-argument here provides requirements for those who would attempt to define such a system.
Preliminaries for r-and f-rationales
For an r-rationale, the crucial assertion is about the relation among arguments, a metaassertion: arguments that were undefeated in the cited case should continue to be undefeated in the current case in order for the past decision to have the proper influence.
For an f-rationale, two kinds of meta-assertion are crucial. They are that a case should have a certain decision, and that a rule fits a set of cases.
There are a few kinds of attacks on rules with f-rationales that we can model and a few that we cannot model. Even for the few that we do model, we must introduce negations of the assertion that a sentence is a reason for another sentence, e.g. not(b >--a).
An r-rationale is similar to a d-rationale. It is at least a set of recorded arguments from the prior dispute. For an r-rationale of a case c, r-rat(c) is a set of undefeated arguments that interfere with each other. It is this interfering set of arguments that the decision of the case resolves, r-rat(c) also contains the implicit argument that when those arguments are undefeated, a certain decision is appropriate. An assumption here is that there is no dispute that the arguments are undefeated (or what is nearly the same, that their status of being undefeated can be determined easily). If the defeat relations among arguments are clear, then this assumption is reasonable.
An argument so far has been a set of defeasible rules from L, and a conclusion derivable from those rules using the accepted (incontrovertible) evidential claims. Henceforth, the set of rules can contain rules from L and meta-rules. These meta-rules involve a specific kind of meta-claim: that a certain set of arguments contains only arguments that are undefeated, or not. They relate this meta-claim to a different kind of meta-claim: a defeasible rule. For example, instead of allowing just a>--b we allow as well the meta-claim
The first occurrence of ">--" above is a relation in the meta-meta-language, and the second occurrence of ">--" is the relation in the meta-language used throughout the preceding sections. Derivations are now allowed to make use of an argument's rules and meta-rules (arguments may use both kinds of ">--"). These impose mathematical demands on the theory of argument. Fortunately, PROLOG implementations have shown that progress can be made with systems defined in this way, e.g., [Sartor 1993b ], despite the mathematical and philosophical conundrums.
Defn. A Set of Undefeated Arguments, undef, under(S) asserts of a set of
arguments, S = {A1, A2 ..... An) that each of those arguments contained in S can be made in the current setting and is undefeated.
If S is such that under(S), then S must be contained in Argsi(L, C, E). The predicate, under, is thus dependent on all of the indexes: i, L, C, and E. Since i is the most important index here, write undefi(S ) when it is important to distinguish the stage at which undef is claimed (see Figure 8) .
The final formulation for r-rationales refines under. As Ashley's HYPO (1989) makes clear, a precedent can be used in the presence of additional arguments pro. If a case decides that argument A1 for h outweighs argument A 2 for not-h, then if A1, A2, and an additional argument for h, A 3, can be made in a new setting, the decision of the prior case is still relevant. The precedent can also be used in a context where there are fewer arguments con than those that figured in the past resolution. Hence, it need not be required that exactly those undefeated arguments in the past case be undefeated in the present case.
Instead, of the predicate undefi(S), suppose there are two predicates: minpro-undefi(S1) and maxcon-undef(S2). The arguments in each of the sets $1 and $2 were weighed in the prior decision, and arguments in $1 taken together were more persuasive than those in $2. If at stage i, at least the arguments in S 1 are undefeated, and if no more than the arguments in S 2 for con are undefeated, then there is defeasible reason for using the case (or more precisely, the rule extracted from the case). If the arguments in $1 cannot be maintained as undefeated at stage i, then the precedent cannot be used. If there are additional arguments con, which were not weighed previously, then the case is again inapplicable.
Defn. Current Disposition of Past Argument, minpro-undef maxcon-undef If S
is a set of arguments such that under(S), then minpro-undef(S1) and maxcon-undef(S2) if $1 and $2 partition S, and $1 contains the arguments pro, $2 contains the arguments con. This definition supposes a formal account of determining when an argument should be considered pro or con. As in HYPO, this determination is trivial if the decision of the case is h and all arguments in $1 and $2 are for h and not-h, respectively. Determining whether an argument is pro or con can be inductively defined in an obvious way, and will not be done here. There will be arguments that support both pro and con arguments, and these most naturally contribute to minpro-undef i and are excluded from maxcon-undefi. An f-rationale is a set of cases, not all of which might be from C. Let HC u C be the actual cases augmented by hypothetical cases. HC are cases that did not actually occur, but are cases upon which there is agreement of the hypothetical decisions given the hypothetical facts. Write ok(case1) if casel's decision is agreeable to both disputants. Once again, we do not seek to model every kind of dispute. Here, we choose not to model disputes over whether a case should have a certain outcome. Some of these disputes could be modeled easily, some would require a complicated recursion, and some are not obviously subject to reason at all.
Instead of introducing a language in which cases are described, suppose simply that there is a relation fit-s0, c), which holds when a defeasible rule 1 fits a case c. For example, the rule 11 ="if fl and f2, then h" fits those cases wherein fl, f2, and h hold. It also fits those cases wherein h does not hold, but at least one of fl or f2 also does not hold. The rule does not fit a case wherein fl, f2, and not-h are all true. This is fit (and non-fit) simpliciter. A more robust concept of a defeasible rule's fit to a case takes account of context (see Figure 9 ).
In the context of a set of other defeasible rules, LCont, 1 might fit a case c even if it does not fit simpliciter. This is because LCont may provide through more specific rules an explanation of why c does not conform to 1, why it is not the case that fit-s(1, c). So a rule may fit, robustus, fit-r(1, c, LCont) when fit-s0, c) or when there is a more specific rule, 1', in LCont which does fit c. The whole apparatus of arguments which permits chaining of rules could be applied here to explain why 1 does not fit c, simpliciter, but is allowed not to fit by a superior chain of rules in LCont. Under the criteria of syntactic superiority advanced in [Simari & Loui 1992 , Prakken 1993 , and Loui et al. 1993a , no chain of rules in LCont will be superior to 1 unless a single rule in LCont is superior to 1. But under other systems, a recursion of disputation is possible here, and woe be to the formalizer who seeks to model this recursion.
Defn. A Rule Fits a Case or Cases, ft-s, fit-r.
For a rule 1, a case c, and a set of rules, LCont: fits-s0, c) holds when 1 fits c. fit-r(1, c, LCont) holds (i) when fit-s(1, c) or (ii) when there is a rule, 1', such that 1' is more specific than 1, 1' in LCont, and 1' fits c. We also write fit-s0, C), for a set of cases, C, if fit-s(1, c) for every case c in the set of cases, C. Similarly for fit-r(1, C).
Arguments of fit based on a larger number of cases are considered better arguments. Likewise, arguments of fit based on a larger context are better arguments. Fit is assumed incontrovertible.
Structures for r-and f-rationales
Formally, an r-rationale is a set of arguments that occurred in the case, a true assertion that all of those arguments are undefeated with respect to one another (none is defeated), and a meta-reason that connects the undefeatedness of certain arguments to the rule putatively extracted from the case. The arguments are partitioned into minpro and maxcon, as discussed above. Technically all that are required are the two sets of arguments, S1 and $2, that occurred in the resolution of the case. The rest can be recovered by implication.
Making the other parts explicit adds clarity.
Defn. Resolution of Argument, r-rat, r-rat(c) = < 1. S = $1 u S 2, 2. minpro-undef(S1), maxcon-undef(S2),
where S is a set of argument partitioned into arguments pro, $I, and con S 2.
The claim of undefeatedness must be true, and the arguments in S must be properly relevant to c. To define proper relevance, consider the rule extracted from the case to be:
There must be an argument in S for 12. We do not insist that all arguments in S be possible with just 11 as evidence. Nor must there be some argument in S that requires all of 11 to be made. Much more weakly, 11 must be relevant to S; it should contain no superfluous literals.
An f-rationale is a set of cases together with a claim that the rule fits (robustus) that set of cases with respect to a context. <HC u C, LCont> is the f-rationale for a rule 1, if and only if for every c in HC u C, fit-r(1, c, LCont). LCont must be a subset of L. As before, a third part is added for clarity.
Defn. The Cases the Rule Fits
where Cases is a set of cases, and Context is a set of rules that includes p >--q.
Attacks for r-and f-rationales
To attack an argument using a rule with r-rationale, cite the rationale and name the argument and rule attacked. Then substitute a revised argument into ArgReci that makes explicit the connection between the undefeated arguments resolved by the case and the rule extracted therefrom. The modified argument is just like the earlier argument except that a meta-rule has been supplied to back the object-level rule. The meta-rule makes explicit the origin of the object-level rule. This allows subsequent attack of the statement that S contains undefeated arguments.
To attack the statement minpro-undef(S), provide a new argument or set of arguments, S', that are arguments that can be made in the current case. Then claim not(minproundef(S)) as a result of the presumed system of determining defeat among arguments. If S' contains an argument that defeats an argument in S, for example, then not every member of S will be undefeated (some member will now be defeated). Similarly, to attack maxcon-undef(S), provide a new argument or set of arguments, S', that can be made in the current case. Then claim not(maxcon-undef(S)) because S' contains a new undefeated argument con.
To attack an argument using an f-rationale, state the f-rationale, then alter either the cases or the context with respect to which fit is claimed. We have assumed that claims of fit are incontrovertible, since we are providing no theory of how this is determined. Adding a case that the rule does not fit is the usual attack.
Simple Symbolic Examples for r-and f-rationales
EXAMPLE. An r-rationale with maxcon-undef attacked. . a> "in order to defend the decision, you must at least be able to argue as before for a, and the opposition must have no better case than before." 2.4 arg 2 = <{ e >--f, f >--not-a }, e! .'. not-a }> "but here is a new argument that adds to con's case in a non-trivial way and requires a re-weighing of arguments." 2.5 not(maxcon-undef({ da2 })) ArgRec2 = { arglrev, dal, da2, arg2 }; dec2 = none.
Note that among da~ and da2, neither is defeating. The opinion in this case is significant because it creates a preference that cannot be found among the syntactically determinable or externally supplied orderings among arguments. The adjudicator chose between competing arguments that could not be decided purely on form. Con revises pro's argument argl by producing arglrev which exposes the meta-reasoning. Then arg2 is produced, which is an additional argument con, and is undefeated. So 2.5 is assertible, not(maxconundef((da2})), which is one of the requirements for using the precedent.
EXAMPLE. An r-rationale with minpro-undef attacked. . a> "in order to defend the decision, you must at least be able to argue as before for a, and the opposition must have no better case than before."
"but here is a new argument" "which alters the status of the argument which, at minimum, must be possible for pro, in order to use the results of the prior case." ArgRec2 = { arglrev, dab da2, arg2 }; dec2 ---none.
Again, among da 1 and da2, neither is defeating, so the opinion in this case is significant. Again, the adjudicator chose between competing arguments that could not be decided purely on form. Con revises pro's argument arg 1 by producing argffev which exposes the meta-reasoning as before. This time, arg 2 is produced, which defeats an essential part of the case, one of the minpro-undef arguments (in fact, the only minpro-undef argument), daa. So 2.5 is assertible, not(minpro-undef((dal})), which again is a requirements for using the precedent.
EXAMPLE. An f-rationale attacked for fit and redeemed in larger context. EXAMPLE. Deepening an r-rationale-based attack. 
. a> "in order to defend the decision, you must at least be able to argue as before for a, and the opposition must have no better case than before."
"but here is a new argument" "which alters the status of the argument which, at minimum, must be possible for pro, in order to use the results of the prior case." ArgRec2 = { argtrev, dal, da2, arg2 }; dec2 = none. This is as before: arg 2 is produced, which defeats an argument that must be minpro-undef. Now pro responds by attacking arg 2 and ejecting it from ArgRec3. "ok, but your argument can be defeated" "which restores the minimum argument(s) pro" ArgRec3 = { arglrev, dal, da2, arg2 arg3 }; dec3 = pro.
Note that the argument pro in the prior case, da I, can be strengthened in the current situation: instead of supporting g with merely b, support g with all of b & e & f. This alone does not suffice to establish a, however. Pro needs to cite the case in which b, a prima facie reason for a, was decided to be more important than c, a prima facie reason for nota. Among the object-level arguments in ArgRec3, { dal, da2, arg2, and arg 3 }, a is not warranted. The important point is that dal was judged more important than da2 in the past, and arg3 prevents arg2 from disrupting the past's bearing on the present.
Related Work and Conclusions
A ratio decidendi is an essential part of a case. To cite a case without attention to the ratio is to make analogies on surface similarities. Casually determined similarities may not actually be relevant to the past decision or its subsequent use. Similar remarks could be made about the application of rules without regard to the principles on which the rules are based: without regard for ratio legis.
There may be some latitude in the use of cases. In some protocols, whoever cites a case must produce the rationale. In other protocols, it is the responsibility of the opposition to raise any problem regarding rationale. Here, the assumption is that ratio decidenci need not always be given when a case is cited as part of an argument. The assumption is that the use of the case is appropriate. The same is true for rules. Unless the use of the case or the use of the rule is disputed, the assumption simplifies arguments. What is important is a mechanism in the protocol for permitting an objection to the use of a rule or case, when a party to the dispute elects to do so.
Rationales, especially r-rationales and d-rationales, illuminate why Ashley can make distinctions among cases [1989] . In our earlier work, rules were extracted from cases. As a rule, sharing of important properties with the precedent was reason for sharing the decision of the precedent. Counterarguments were possible only by finding reasons for the opposite decision. Ashley and our improved analysis of r-rationales permit more sophisticated counterarguing. The opposition can simply cite properties that the present case does not share with the precedent. This kind of distinction becomes possible when an r-rationale or d-rationale of the case is available for examination.
Berman and Hafner recently discussed the telology of rules [1993] . The rationales of the rules they discuss are more complicated than the kinds discussed here. Their rationales involve a fundamentally different kind of reasoning: the reasoning about compromises in policy-making. The present work is less ambitious in scope and more ambitious in formality. It remains to be seen how many rationales can be expressed as compilation rationales of the five kinds explored here. Future work must surely be directed at representing the most important rationales in a particular legal domain. We do not expect that the full range of principles discussed for instance in Hart [1961] , Dworkin [1985] , or Peczenik [1989] could be accommodated with compilation rationales. The rationales chosen for investigation here are just the ones most amenable to treatment in the existing model of argument and disputation. Branting [ 1993] is a formal analysis of rationales that does not rely on argument systems.
Prakken briefly discusses the possibility of modeling principle and purpose [1983] . He follows Gardner [1987] by taking most of the principle and purpose to be reflected in the matching of past cases to present case: i.e., in the extraction of rules from cases. "In this way it is possible to account for the defeasibility of legal rules caused by principle and purpose without having to complicate the formal model too much." Of course, the matching of cases must be performed on the essential aspects of the case. It was precisely the delineation of the essential from the inessential that led us to investigate explicit representation of rationales. Ashley [1989] , for example, assumes that only the important aspects of cases are formalized in the first place.
Prakken, noting agreement with Berman and Hafner, notes that reasoning with rationales will be unavoidably meta-level reasoning. Applying the model will determine whether the added representational power is worth the complication of the model to include meta-reasoning.
Formality plays an important role in some of AI's interpretations of legal reasoning. Once the importance of rationales is acknowledged, the questions arise: what kinds of rationales? represented in what way? introduced according to what protocol? General studies of argument, such as Toulmin's, have provided room for criticising the backing of a rule, for attacking the grounds on which it was adopted. But no prior work known to us has attempted to present details of this knowledge, their structures, and the processes in which they participate. The future automaters of rule-based and case-based legal reasoning, we hope studies of this kind will be useful.
